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Abstract
We prove a tight lower bound (up to constant factors) on the sample complexity of any
non-interactive local differentially private protocol for optimizing a linear function over the
simplex. This lower bound also implies a tight lower bound (again, up to constant factors) on
the sample complexity of any non-interactive local differentially private protocol implementing
the exponential mechanism. These results reveal that any local protocol for these problems has
exponentially worse dependence on the dimension than corresponding algorithms in the central
model. Previously, Kasiviswanathan et al. (FOCS 2008) proved an exponential separation
between local and central model algorithms for PAC learning the class of parity functions. In
contrast, our lower bound are quantitatively tight, apply to a simple and natural class of linear
optimization problems, and our techniques are arguably simpler.
1 Introduction
In the past few years, there has been a wave of commercially deployed systems for differentially
private [DMNS06] data analysis, most notably Google’s RAPPOR [EPK14] running in the Chrome
Browser and Apple’s implementation in iOS. These deployments make it possible to perform
statistical analysis of users’ sensitive data without compromise those users’ individual privacy.
These systems operate in the so-called (non-interactive) local model of differential privacy. In these
protocols, each user separately produces a differentially private response, and sends this response
to a possibly untrusted aggregator who can then extract some useful information about the set of
users. Local protocols have several advantages: each user’s privacy is ensured even if the other
users and aggregator are all malicious, and they require each party to asynchronously send only a
single short message. However, the most expressive and accurate differentially private algorithms
can only be implemented in the central model of differential privacy, in which all users’ send their
data in the clear to a trusted aggregator who runs some differentially private algorithm.
Starting with Beimel, Nissim, and Omri [BNO08] and Kasiviswanathan et al. [KLN+08] there
has been considerable effort to understand the relative power of the local and central models
of differential privacy [CSS12, HKR12, DJW13, BS15]. These works show quantitative—roughly
quadratic—separations between the number of samples required to solve certain learning problems
in these two models. The classic example of such a problem is estimating the mean of a {±1}-valued
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random variable. In the central model this problem can be solved up to error α with ε-differential
privacy using O( 1α2 +
1
αε ) samples via the laplace mechanism [DMNS06]. In contrast, local protocols
require Ω( 1α2ε2 ) samples for the same problem.
However, there are more powerful differentially private algorithms in the central model that
seem to have no analogue in the local model, most notably the celebrated exponential mechanism of
McSherry and Talwar [MT07]. The exponential mechanism is one of the most fundamental tools for
analyzing high-dimensional datasets subject to differential privacy, and has numerous application:
PAC learning [KLN+08], synthetic data generation [BLR13], frequent itemset mining [BLST10],
feature selection and sparse regression [TS13, TTZ15, LCS+16], multiple hypothesis testing [DSZ15],
and many more. For all of these problems, the best algorithms in the local model require an
exponential increase in the number of samples.
Kasiviswanathan et al. [KLN+08] showed that there is no general purpose analogue of the
exponential mechanism in the local model. Specifically, they showed that the exponential mech-
anism is sufficient to PAC learn the class of PARITY functions over {±1}d using n = O( dα2 + dαε )
samples, whereas any local model protocol for this problem requires a number of samples that
grows exponentially with the dimension d. Therefore, any local model protocol implementing the
exponential mechanism requires exponentially more samples. However, this lower bound relies
on a general connection between the local model and statistical-query algorithms, and is therefore
somewhat specific to PAC learning, not quantitatively tight, and somewhat involved technically.
The contribution of this work is to prove quantitatively tight lower bounds for local protocols
solving very simple and natural selection problems. Specifically, we consider two natural selection
problems: finding the most significant feature and stochastic linear optimization over a simplex or `1-ball.
Our proofs use the information-theoretic framework for analyzing differentially private algo-
rithms [MMP+10, DJW13, BS15], and are arguably simpler and more direct than the lower bounds
of Kasiviswanathan et al. Conceptually, the message of our results is that locally differentially
private algorithms are severely limited for solving sparse, high-dimensional problems.
1.1 Our Results
Selecting a Significant Feature. One of the simplest applications of the exponential mechanism is
to select the coordinate of a distribution over {±1}d with the largest mean. Specifically, we have
some distribution P over {±1}d with mean µ = E [P ] and each user i = 1, . . . ,n receives an iid sample
Xi ∼ P . The goal is to identify the coordinate j such that µj is as large as possible. This is the
prototypical application of the exponential mechanism, which shows that this problem can be solved
in a differentially private way using n = O( logdα2 +
logd
αε ), and this bound is tight [BU17, SU17]. In
contrast, the natural local model protocol for this algorithm is to use randomized response [War65]
to estimate each coordinate of µ, which requires n = Θ(d logdα2ε2 ) samples—an exponentially worse
dependence on d. Our first result shows that this simple local algorithm is optimal up to constant
factors, even if we restrict P to be a product distribution.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Suppose there is a non-interactive ε-differentially private local protocolM that
takes n iid samples X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) from an arbitrary product distribution P over {±1}d with mean µ and
outputs a coordinate j such that
E
X,j
[
µj
]
≥max
k
µk −α,
then n =Ω(d logdα2ε2 ). The same holds if we replace maxk µk with maxk |µk |.
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Proof Overview. Our proof of Theorem 1.1 uses information-theoretic techniques most similar to
those used by McGregor et al. [MMP+10]; Duchi, Jordan, and Wainwright [DJW13]; and Bassily
and Smith [BS15] to analyze two-party and local differentially private algorithms. As with most
lower bounds for statistical estimation, we construct a hard family of distributions P = {Pj} such
that (1) any algorithm satisfying the accuracy assumption of Theorem 1.1 can be used to uniquely
identify the specific distribution Pj , and (2) any algorithm that can be used to identify the specific
distribution Pj requires many samples. In our construction, Pj is just the uniform distribution over
{±1}d except that the j-th coordinate is biased with mean +2α, so it is easy to see that (1) is satisfied.
To establish (2), it (roughly) suffices to show that for every ε-differentially private algorithm R,
E
j∼[d]
[
KL(R(Pj )‖R(U ))
]
(1)
is small where U is the uniform distribution on {±1}d . The resulting sample complexity bound
will be roughly the inverse of (1). The typical way to bound (1) is to argue that the family of
distributions form a packing where KL(R(Pj )‖R(U )) is small for every j. However, this will
not work in our case because for every j there is a differentially private algorithm Rj such that
KL(Rj(Pj ),Rj(U )) =Ω(α2ε2), which is too large to establish Theorem 1.1. This algorithm ignores all
coordinates except j and privately estimates the mean of the j-th coordinate. Intuitively, in order
to bound (1), we need to formalize the intuition that every differentially private algorithm has a
“privacy budget” that must be shared across the d coordinates, so each coordinate may use only a
small fraction of the privacy budget. Specifically, we are able to show that for every ε-differentially
private algorithm R,
E
j∼[d]
[
KL(R(Pj )‖R(U ))
]
=O
(
α2ε2
d
)
,
which intuitively means that on average the algorithm uses (ε/
√
d)-differential privacy per coordi-
nate. We establish this fact using a Fourier-analytic argument.
Stochastic Sparse Linear Optimization. A fundamental tool in statistical estimation is stochastic
convex/concave optimization. Unsurprisingly, there has been considerable attention on under-
standing the sample complexity of differentially private stochastic optimization in both the central
model [CMS11, KST12, BST14, TTZ15, Ull15] and the local model [DJW13, STU17]. One important
case is sparse optimization, where we want to maximize Ef ∼P [f (θ)] over θ in the simplex ∆(d) ⊆Rd
and every function f : ∆(d)→R in the support of P is concave and has `∞-bounded gradients.
In the special case where the functions f are linear, then these problems can be solved privately
in the central model using n = O( logdα2 +
logd
αε ) samples via the exponential mechanism. More
generally, Talwar, Thakurta, and Zhang [TTZ15] showed that any concave maximization problem
in this setting can be solved in the central model using n = poly(logd, 1α ,
1
ε ) samples. In contrast, all
known local protocols for this sort of optimization problem require at least n =Ω(d) samples, even
for the special case of linear optimization.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). Suppose there is a non-interactive ε-differentially private local protocolM that
takes n iid samples X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) from an arbitrary product distribution P over {±1}d with mean µ and
outputs a vector θˆ ∈ ∆(d) such that
E
X,θˆ
[
E
x∼P
[〈
x, θˆ
〉]]
≥ max
θ∈∆(d)
E
x∼P [〈x,θ〉]−α,
then n =Ω(d logdα2ε2 ). The same holds if we replace the simplex in R
d with the the `1-unit-ball in Rd .
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We remark that Theorem 1.2 is quantitatively tight for linear optimization problems, since
randomized response can be used to solve this problem with sample complexity O(d logdα2ε2 ). For
more general concave minimization problems, there are interactive local model protocols that match
the lower bound of Theorem 1.2 up to polynomial factors [TTZ15], but there is no matching upper
bound for non-interactive local protocols (and such an upper bound is unlikely [STU17]).
2 Preliminaries
A dataset is a collection X = (X1,X2, . . . ) ∈ X ∗ of n samples in some domain X . Two datasets
X,X ′ ∈ X ∗ are neighboring if X ′ can be obtained from X by adding, removing, or swapping one
sample.
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06]). A randomized algorithm M : X ∗ → Y is (ε,δ)-
differentially private if for every neighboring datasets X,X ′ ∈ X ∗, and every Y ⊆ Y ,
P [M(X) ∈ Y ] ≤ eεP[M(X ′) ∈ Y ]+ δ.
The parameters ε,δ may be functions of n.
2.1 Locally Differentially Private Protocols
In a local protocol, each of the n samples is held by a separate party. Each party randomizes
their data independently, and then submits them to an aggregator, who collects the n random
messages and produces some output.
Definition 2.2 (Local Differentially Private Protocols). We say that an algorithmM : X ∗→Y is a
(non-interactive) local protocol if it can be written in the form
M(X) =A(R(X1), . . . ,R(Xn))
for some local randomizer R : X → Z and some aggregator A : Z∗ → Y . In this case we write
M = (R,A). We say that a (non-interactive) local protocolM = (R,A) satisfies (ε,δ)-local differential
privacy if the local randomizer R (but not necessarily A) satisfies (ε,δ)-differential privacy.
We remark that none of our results would change if we allowed each sample Xi to be random-
ized using a different local randomizer Ri . However, it will ease notation slightly to focus on the
case where each sample uses the same local randomizer R.
The following lemma of Bun, Nelson, and Stemmer [BNS17] asserts that it is essentially without
loss of generality to focus on (ε,0)-locally differentially private protocols.
Lemma 2.3 ([BNS17]). SupposeM : X ∗→ Y is an (ε,δ)-differentially private local protocol with ε ≤ 1
and δ =O(1/n1.01). Then there is an (O(ε),0)-differentially private local protocolM′ : X ∗→Y such that
for every dataset X ∈ X ∗, SD(M′(X),M(X)) ≤ on(1).
Above, SD(P ,Q) denotes the statistical distance between the two distributions.
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2.2 Information-Theoretic Preliminaries
Our proof relies on some standard information-theoretic tools, which we quickly recall. Readers
who are familiar with lower bounds for statistical estimation can likely skip this section.
We use the convention log(x) = log2(x). Let Z be a probability distribution over some support
Z and let pZ(z) = P [Z = z] denote its probability mass function. (For notational convenience we
assume the support is finite and use the probability-mass function, however this is not essential
for any of our results.) The entropy of Z is defined to be H(Z) = E
z∼Z
[
log 1pZ (z)
]
. For a joint distribu-
tion (Z,Z ′), the conditional entropy is H(Z | Z ′) = E
z′∼Z ′ [H(Z | Z
′ = z)], and the mutual information is
I(Z;Z ′) =H(Z)−H(Z | Z ′).
We will use two notions of distance between probability distributions Z and Z ′. Namely, the
KL divergence and χ2-divergence are defined as
KL (Z‖Z ′) = E
z∼Z
[
log
(
pZ(z)
pZ ′ (z)
)]
and χ2 (Z‖Z ′) = E
z∼Z ′
[
(pZ(z)− pZ ′ (z))2
pZ ′ (z)2
]
.
We will use the fact that χ2 upper bounds KL. That is, KL (Z‖Z ′) ≤ χ2 (Z‖Z ′). We also use the fact
that I(Z;Z ′) = KL ((Z,Z ′)‖Z ⊗Z ′) where Z ⊗Z ′ denotes the product distribution with marginals Z
and Z ′ , respectively. The final tool we use is (a convenient special case of) Fano’s Inequality: if Z,Z ′
are jointly distributed random variables, each supported on Z, then P [Z = Z ′] ≤ I(Z;Z ′)+1log |Z| .
3 Main Lower Bound
In this section will introduce and prove a tight lower bound for locally differentially private
protocols solving a certain hard statistical estimation problem. In Section 4 we will formalize the
connection between this hard problem and the problems discussed in the introduction.
Before stating our lower bound, we introduce the hard statistical estimation problem. Let d ∈N
and α ∈ [0,1] be parameters. Let Ud be the uniform distribution over x ∈ {±1}d . For every b ∈ {±1}
and j ∈ [d], we define the distribution Pd,α,b,j to be uniform over x ∈ {±1}d except that xj = b with
probability 12 +α. Formally,
Pd,α,b,j = α · (Ud | xj = b) + (1−α) ·Ud .
Let B be uniform over {±1} and let Jd be uniform over [d]. Let Pα,d,B,Jd be the uniform mixture over
distributions Pα,d,b,j . Note that by construction, for every d,α, Pd,α,B,Jd =Ud . As the parameters d,α
will be clear from context, we will omit them and simply write U,Pb,j ,B, J . The next theorem is a
tight lower bound on the number of samples needed to infer B,J given X1, . . . ,Xn drawn iid from
the conditional distribution (PB,J | B,J).
Theorem 3.1. Fix any d ≥ 32, α ∈ [0,1], and ε > 0. Let B,J,PB,J be the distributions defined above (with
parameters d,α). Suppose M is an (ε,0)-locally differentially private protocol and n is such that
P
B,J,X1,...,Xn∼(PB,J |B,J),M
[M(X1, . . . ,Xn) = (B,J)] ≥ 13 .
Then
n ≥ d log2(2d)
6α2(eε − 1)2 =Ω
(
d logd
α2ε2
)
.
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We prove Theorem 3.1 using an information-theoretic argument. The main novelty is to establish
a bound on the mutual information between the output of the local randomizer Zi = R(Xi) and
the distribution parameters (B,J), which is done in Lemma 3.2. First we prevent the outline of the
argument and introduce this key lemma, and afterwards we will prove the key lemma.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Throughout the proof, we fix the parameters d,α,ε. Let the distributions
B,J,PB,J be as defined above (with parameters d,α). Let M = (R,A) be a locally differentially
private protocol with local randomizer R : {±1}d → Z. Let X1, . . . ,Xn be iid samples from the
conditional distribution (PB,J | B,J) and let Z1 =R(X1), . . . ,Zn =R(Xn) be the differentially private
responses. Let Z be the marginal distribution of each Zi . Then we can write
I(Z1, . . . ,Zn;B,J) =
n∑
i=1
I(Zi ;B,J | Z1, . . . ,Zi−1)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Zi | Z1, . . . ,Zi−1)−H(Zi | B,J,Z1, . . . ,Zi−1)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Zi)−H(Zi | B,J)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Zi ;B,J)
= n · I(Z;B,J) (2)
where the inequality is because conditioning can only reduce entropy, and because Z1, . . . ,Zn are
independent conditioned on B,J .
We will use Zb,j as shorthand for the conditional distribution (Z | B = b, J = j). That is, Zb,j is the
distribution obtained by running R(X) on a random sample X ∼ Pb,j . Note that, Z = ZB,J .
I(Z;B,J) = KL ((B,J,Z)‖(B,J)⊗Z)
= E
b∼B,j∼J
[
KL
(
Zb,j‖Z
)]
(Chain rule for KL-divergence)
≤ E
b∼B,j∼J
[
χ2
(
Zb,j‖Z
)]
(χ2 upper bounds KL)
The main technical part of the proof is to establish the following lemma, which we defer to later.
Lemma 3.2. If R : X →Z is (ε,0)-differentially private, Z =R(PB,J ) and Zb,j =R(Pb,j ), then
E
b∼B,j∼J
[
χ2
(
Zb,j‖Z
)]
=
α2(eε − 1)2
d
=O
(
α2ε2
d
)
(3)
Assuming that we can establish Lemma 3.2, then by Fano’s inequality and (2), we have
P [M(X1, . . . ,Xn) = (B,J)] ≤ n · I(Z;B,J) + 1log2(2d)
=O
(
nα2ε2
d logd
+
1
logd
)
,
from which we conclude that in order to successfully output B,J with probability at least 1/3, we
must have n ≥ d log2 d6α2(eε−1)2 as desired (assuming d ≥ 32). This completes the proof of the theorem,
modulo the proof of Lemma 3.2.
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To complete the proof, we now turn our attention to proving Lemma 3.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. As a shorthand, we will use
pZ(z) := P [Z = z] = P
[
R(PB,J ) = z
]
and pZb,j (z) = P
[
Zb,j = z
]
= P
[
R(Pb,j ) = z
]
Note that in the first case the randomness is over (B,J), PB,J , and R, whereas in the second case the
probability is over Pb,j and R. Recall the definition of χ2-divergence,
E
b∼B,j∼J
[
χ2
(
Zb,j‖Z
)]
= E
b∼B,j∼J
 Ez∼Z
 (pZb,j (z)− pZ(z))2pZ(z)2
 (4)
In order to bound (4), we will fix a particular choice of b, j,z and analyze the quantity
(pZb,j (z)−pZ (z))2
pZ (z)2
.
Let pZ(z | x) = P [R(x) = z] be the distribution of Z when we condition on a specific sample x. Note
that since we are conditioning on a particular sample x, the distribution parameters (B,J) become
irrelevant. Then we can write
(pZb,j (z)− pZ(z))2
pZ(z)2
=
1
pZ(z)2
(
E
x∼Pb,j
[pZ(z | x)]− E
x∼U [pZ(z | x)]
)2
=
(
E
x∼Pb,j
[
pZ(z | x)
pZ(z)
]
− E
x∼U
[
pZ(z | x)
pZ(z)
])2
=
(
E
x∼Pb,j
[
pZ(z | x)
pZ(z)
− 1
]
− E
x∼U
[
pZ(z | x)
pZ(z)
− 1
])2
=
(
E
x∼Pb,j
[ζz(x)]− E
x∼U [ζz(x)]
)2
(5)
where we have defined the function ζz(x) :=
pZ (z|x)
pZ (z)
− 1. The following claim is now immediate from
the definition of ε-differential privacy.
Claim 3.3. For every choice of z, ‖ζz‖∞ ≤ eε − 1.
In order to complete the proof we need the following claim. Intuitively, the claim states that the
function ζ(x) has low correlation on average with each coordinate of x. The proof of the claim uses
Fourier analysis of the function ζ.
Claim 3.4. For every choice of z, and every function ζ : {±1}d →R
E
b∼B,j∼J
( Ex∼Pb,j [ζ(x)]− Ex∼U [ζ(x)]
)2 ≤ α2‖ζ‖2∞d
Proof of Claim 3.4. Recall the definition of the Fourier transform over the Boolean hypercube {±1}d :
∀S ⊆ [d] ζ̂(S) = E
x∼U
ζ(x) ·∏
j∈S
xj
.
Aside from the definition, the only fact we will need about Fourier analysis is Parseval’s identity,
which asserts that ∑
S⊆[d]
ζ̂(S)2 = E
x∼U
[
ζ(x)2
]
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Now, recall that we defined Pb,j so that Pb,j = α · (U | xj = b) + (1−α) ·U . Therefore,(
E
x∼Pb,j
[ζ(x)]− E
x∼U [ζ(x)]
)2
=
(
α · E
x∼U
[
ζ(x) | xj = b
]
−α · E
x∼U [ζ(x)]
)2
= α2
(1
2
· E
x∼U
[
ζ(x) | xj = b
]
− 1
2
· E
x∼U
[
ζ(x) | xj = −b
])2
= α2
(
b · E
x∼U
[
ζ(x) · xj
])2
= α2 · ζ̂({j})2
where the final equality uses the fact that b ∈ {±1}. To finish the proof, we have
E
b∼B,j∼J
( Ex∼Pb,j [ζ(x)]− Ex∼U [ζ(x)]
)2 = Eb∼B,j∼J [α2 · ζ̂({j})2]
=
α2
d
∑
j∈[d]
ζ̂({j})2
≤ α
2
d
∑
S⊆[d]
ζ̂(S)2 =
α2
d
E
x∼U
[
ζ(x)2
]
(Parseval’s identity)
≤ α
2‖ζ‖2∞
d
This completes the proof of the claim.
Combining Claims 3.3 and 3.4 with (4) gives
E
b∼B,j∼J
[
χ2
(
Zb,j‖Z
)]
= E
b∼B,j∼J
 Ez∼Z
 (pZb,j (z)− pZ(z))2pZ(z)2

= E
b∼B,j∼J
 Ez∼Z
( Ex∼Pb,j [ζz(x)]− Ex∼U [ζz(x)]
)2 (By (5))
= E
z∼Z
 Eb∼B,j∼J
( Ex∼Pb,j [ζz(x)]− Ex∼U [ζz(x)]
)2
= E
z∼Z
[
α2‖ζz‖2∞
d
]
(Claim 3.4)
=
α2(eε − 1)2
d
(Claim 3.3)
This completes the proof of the lemma.
In order to make the proof simpler, we symmetrized the distribution PB,J by using the random
sign-bit B. However, it is easy to see that the sign bit is not necessary to obtain the lower bound,
simply because any algorithm that is accurate with probability at least 2/3 conditioned on B = +1 is
also accurate with probability at least 1/3 when B is random. Therefore we obtain the following
easy corollary.
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Corollary 3.5. Fix any d ≥ 32, α ∈ [0,1], and ε > 0. Let J,P+1,J be the distributions defined above (with
parameters d,α). Suppose M is an (ε,0)-locally differentially private protocol and n is such that
P
J,X1,...,Xn∼(P+1,J |J),M
[M(X1, . . . ,Xn) = J] ≥ 23 .
Then
n ≥ d log2(2d)
6α2(eε − 1)2 =Ω
(
d logd
α2ε2
)
.
Theorem 1.1 in the introduction follows immediately from Corollary 3.5 because any algorithm
that identifies a coordinate with approximately maximum mean (the assumption of Theorem 1.1)
can be used to identify the coordinate J using samples from P+1,J (the assumption of Corollary 3.5).
4 Lower Bounds for Stochastic Optimization
In this section we show how Theorem 3.1 implies tight lower bounds for locally differentially
private protocols solving an important and widely studied problems in private stochastic optimiza-
tion. Consider a stochastic linear optimization over the `1 ball where the linear objective functions
have gradients bounded in the `∞ norm. We use
Bd1 =
{
θ ∈Rd : ‖x‖1 = 1
}
and Bd∞ =
{
x ∈Rd : ‖x‖∞ ≤ 1
}
to denote the `1 and `∞ unit balls in Rd , respectively. Any point x ∈ Bd∞ gives rise to a linear loss
function fx : Bd1→R by fx(θ) = 〈x,θ〉. Given a distribution P over Bd∞, we obtain a stochastic linear
optimization problem to find
θ∗P := argmax
θ∈Bd1
E
x∼P [〈x,θ〉]
The next theorem is an application of Theorem 3.1, and shows that any locally differentially private
algorithm for solving stochastic linear optimization in the `1/`∞ setting requires sample complexity
growing polynomially in d.
Theorem 4.1. Fix any d ≥ 32,α ∈ [0,1], and ε > 0. Suppose M : (Bd∞)n → Bd1 is an (ε,0)-locally
differentially private protocol such that for every product distribution P over Bd∞,
P
X1,...,Xn∼P ,M
[
E
x∼P
[〈
x,θ∗P −M(X1, . . . ,Xn)
〉] ≤ α
3
]
≥ 1
3
Then
n ≥ d log2d
6α2(eε − 1)2 =Ω
(
d logd
α2ε2
)
.
Proof. Recall that the vertices of the `1 ball in Rd are the 2d vectors V = {b~ej : b ∈ {±1}, j ∈ [d]} where
~ej denotes the j-th coordinate-basis vector in Rd . Since the maximizer of then linear objective
function must occur at one of the vertices, we can write
θ∗P = argmax
θ∈Bd1
E
x∼P [〈x,θ〉] = argmaxb~ej∈V
E
x∼P
[
〈x,b~ej〉
]
= argmax
bej∈V
E
x∼P
[
bxj
]
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Thus, θ∗P = b~ej where j is the coordinate whose mean has the largest absolute value and b is the
sign of the mean of the j-th coordinate.
Now, let Pb,j be the distributions defined in Theorem 3.1. For these distributions, by construction
we have θ∗Pb,j = b~ej and Ex∼Pb,j [bxj ] ≥ α. Moreover, for any other b′~ej ′ ∈ V , Ex∼Pb,j [b′xj ′ ] ≤ 0. Thus,
for any θˆ ∈ Bd1 we can conclude that
E
x∼Pb,j
[
bxj − 〈x, θˆ〉
]
≤ α
3
=⇒ bθˆj ≥ 1
Thus, any θˆ that approximately maximizes the linear objective uniquely identifies the correct
distribution parameters b, j. So, if M satisfies the assumption of the corollary, and PB,J is the
uniform mixture of the distributions Pb,j , then
P
b∼B,j∼J,X1,...,Xn∼Pb,j ,M
[
E
x∼Pb,j
[〈
x,θ∗Pb,j −M(X1, . . . ,Xn)
〉]
≤ α
3
]
≥ 1
3
=⇒ P
b∼B,j∼J,X1,...,Xn∼Pb,j ,M
[
b ·M(X1, . . . ,Xn) ≥ 23
]
≥ 1
3
Therefore, any algorithmM that outputs an (α/3)-approximate maximizer can also be used to
identify the distribution parameters b, j. By Theorem 3.1, any such algorithmM requires at least
n =Ω(d logdα2ε2 ) samples.
We remind the reader that Theorem 4.1 is optimal up to constant factors, as there is a simple
algorithm based on randomized response that finds an α-approximate maximizer the objective
function using O(d logdα2ε2 ) samples.
Theorem 4.1 should be contrasted with the fact that in the central model there is a simple differen-
tially private algorithm for solving stochastic linear optimization that requires only logarithmically
many samples in d. The algorithm is an immediate application of the exponential mechanism [MT07],
and its guarantee is stated in the next lemma.
Theorem 4.2 (Application of [MT07]). Fix d ∈N,α ∈ [0,1], and ε > 0. For some n = O
( logd
α2 +
logd
αε
)
,
there is an (ε,0)-differentially private (but not locally differentially private) algorithm M : (Bd∞)n→ Bd1 such
that for any distribution P over [±1]d ,
P
X1,...,Xn∼P ,M
[
E
x∼P
[〈
x,θ∗P −M(X1, . . . ,Xn)
〉] ≤ α] ≥ 99
100
.
In fact, Talwar, Thakurta, and Zhang [TTZ15] showed an algorithm that achieves a similar
guarantee (although with slightly weaker parameters) even for the more general problem of
maximizing an arbitrary concave function whose gradients are bounded in the `∞ norm over
the `1 ball. Thus, there is a stark contrast between the central model, where we can solve any
`1/`∞-bounded concave maximization problem using poly(logd) samples, and the local model,
where even maximizing an `1/`∞-bounded linear objective requires Ω(d logd) samples.
Optimization Over the Simplex. Using Corollary 3.5 in place of Theorem 3.1 we easily obtain
the following analogous result for optimization over the simplex.
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Corollary 4.3. Fix d ≥ 32,α ∈ [0,1], and ε > 0. Suppose M : (Bd∞)n→ Bd1 is an (ε,0)-locally differentially
private protocol such that for every product distribution P over Bd∞,
P
X1,...,Xn∼P ,M
[
E
x∼P
[〈
x,θ∗∗P −M(X1, . . . ,Xn)
〉] ≤ α
3
]
≥ 2
3
where θ∗∗P := argmaxθ∈∆(d) Ex∼P [〈x,θ〉]. Then
n ≥ d log2d
6α2(eε − 1)2 =Ω
(
d logd
α2ε2
)
.
Theorem 1.2 in the introduction now follows immediately from Corollary 4.3.
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